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Supreme Court Docket No. 43658-2015 
CASE NO. CR2015-I3 
JEREMY WAYNE SEW ARD, 
Defendant/ Appellant. 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
APPEAL FROM THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
ST A TE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF CANYON 
CHRISTOPHER S. NYE 
District Judge 
FOR THE APPELLANT: Matthew J. Roker 
LOY AN ROKER & ROUNDS, P.C. 
717 S. Kimball, Suite 200 
Caldwell, Idaho 83605 
FOR THE RESPONDENT: LA WREN CE G. WAS DEN 
Idaho Attorney General 
Statehouse, Room 210 
Post Office Box 83720 
Boise, Idaho 83720-0010 
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Appellant was charged with felony Driving Under the Influence. Defendant moved to 
suppress evidence arguing that he was seized in violation of his State and Federal Constitution 
Rights. A motion to suppress hearing was held and following the presentation of evidence the 
District Court denied the motion to suppress evidence finding that although Appellant was seized 
for Fourth Amendment purpose, the Officer had reasonable suspicion to effectuate the seizure. 
COURSE OF PROCEEDINGS 
On December 26, 2014, Defendant was charged by citation with Misdemeanor Driving 
Under the Influence. The State filed a motion to amend the Complaint to a Felony. On January 
23, 2016, the Court granted the State's motion and amended the charge to felony Driving Under 
the Influence. Appellant waived his preliminary hearing on March 6, 2015 and pied not guilty at 
his District Court Arraignment on March 20, 2015. Appellant timely filed his Motion to 
Suppress Evidence on April 17, 2015. On May 12, 2015 a hearing was held on the motion to 
suppress. Following the presentation of evidence the District Court made oral findings of fact on 
the record and denied Appellant's Motion to Suppress Evidence. On July 6, 2015, pursuant to a 
Rule 11 plea agreement reserving his right to appeal the denial of his motion to suppress 
evidence, Appellant entered a plea of guilty to the felony Driving Under the Influence. On July 
8, 2015, the District Court entered a written Order denying Appellant's motion to suppress 
evidence. On September 14, 2015, Appellant was sentenced to two years fixed followed by five 
years indeterminate for a total aggregate sentence of seven years. The sentence was suspended 
and Appellant placed on probation for a period of four years. Appellant filed a timely notice of 
appeal on October 21, 2015. 
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STATEMENT OF FACTS 
on 26, Officer 
Department was on patrol a marked car and observed a vehicle parked outside a 
bar in Parma, Idaho. Tr. P. 5 Ls. 6-15 and P. 17 Ls. 2-5. Ashcraft had received information 
months earlier that the vehicle belonged to Jeremy Seward, the Appellant. Also, that Appellant 
did not have a valid driver's license and had a warrant for his arrest. Tr. P. 5 Ls. 19-24. Ashcraft 
had been informed through an anonymous tip that Appellant was the person who drove the 
vehicle on a regular basis. Tr. P. 20 Ls. 11-18. Ashcraft does not know how many people are in 
the Appellant's family and believes it is possible other people could drive the vehicle. Tr. P. 40 
Ls. 6-12. Ashcraft ran the license plate on the vehicle and found that it was registered to both the 
Appellant and Appellant's brother. Tr P. 6 Ls. 4-14. Ashcraft also confirmed at that time that 
Appellant did not have a valid driver's license and had a misdemeanor warrant for failure to 
appear. Tr. P. 14 Ls. 3-6. Later that evening at approximately 10:40 p.m. Ashcraft was parked 
when he observed the vehicle drive past him. Tr P. 7 Ls. 1-14. Ashcraft followed the vehicle 
but was unable to see who was inside the vehicle. Tr P. 7 Ls. 15-20. As Ashcraft followed the 
vehicle he did not observe any driving offenses. Tr. P. 8 Ls. 24-25 and P. 9 L. 1. The vehicle 
pulled into a private driveway. Tr. P. 9 Ls. 2-4. Ashcraft testified that it was immediately after 
he turned around and was able to catch up to the vehicle that the vehicle turned into the 
driveway. Tr. P. 22 Ls. 6-18. The vehicle parked about two or three car lengths from the trailer 
house. Tr. P. 34 Ls. 8-13. Ashcraft testified that the house where the vehicle pulled into the 
driveway was not where any of the Seward's lived. Tr. P. 33 Ls. 16-24. Ashcraft had previous 
contact with the people who lived in the home but could not see if any where in the vehicle. Tr. 
P. 41 Ls. 8-15. Ashcraft pulled behind the vehicle at a forty-five degree angle. Tr. P. 9 Ls. 7-10. 
Ashcraft then approached the vehicle and for the first time was able to identify the Appellant 
seated on the driver's side and Appellant's brother seated on the passenger's side. Tr P. 11 Ls. 
7-25 and P. 16 Ls. 9-13. Ashcraft returned to his patrol car and called into dispatch Appellant's 
information and for the first time was able to identify that the warrant was for daytime or 
nighttime. Tr. P. 39 Ls. 1-23. Appellant was administered field sobriety tests and a blood draw 
was conducted with the results later showing Defendant to be in excess of the legal limit. Tr. P. 
15 Ls. 23-25 and P. 16 Ls. 1-8. 
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ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL 
err police had reasonable to 
a 
2) Should Appellant's identification as the driver of the vehicle be excluded from evidence 
because of the unlawful seizure? 
ATTORNEY FEES ON APPEAL 
None. 
ARGUMENT 
Standard of Review 
"The standard of review of a suppression motion is bifurcated. When a decision on a 
motion to suppress is challenged, we accept the trial court's findings of fact that are supported by 
substantial evidence, but we freely review the application of constitutional principles to the facts 
as found. At a suppression hearing, the power to assess the credibility of witnesses, resolve 
factual conflicts, weigh evidence, and draw factual inferences is vested in the trial court. (internal 
citations omitted)." State v. Liechty, 267 P.3d 1278 at 1281, 152 Idaho 163 at 166 (Ct.App. 
2011) 
The Initial Seizure of Appellant Was Unreasonable 
"An encounter between a law enforcement officer and a citizen does not trigger Fourth 
Amendment scrutiny unless it is nonconsensual. A seizure under the meaning of the Fourth 
Amendment occurs only 'when the officer, by means of physical force or show of authority, has 
in some way restrained the liberty of a citizen.' (internal citations omitted)." State v. Willoughby, 
211 P.3d 91 at 95, 147 Idaho 482 at 486 (Idaho 2009) 
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"Other circumstances that may indicate a seizure include whether an officer used 
lights or took to a vehicle's route 
" at , 1 Idaho 860, 
The District Court heard testimony on whether Officer Ashcraft had used his car to block 
Appellant from being able to leave. Tr. P. 44 Ls. 2-13 and P. 52 Ls. 11-16. The Court's findings 
of fact are that Officer Ashcraft using his patrol car to block Appellant into the driveway and 
prevent him from leaving seized Appellant. Tr. P. 63 Ls .. 12-15. 
"A traffic stop, which constitutes a seizure under the Fourth Amendment, must be 
supported by reasonable and articulable suspicion that the vehicle is being driven contrary to 
traffic laws or that either the vehicle or the occupant is subject to detention in connection with a 
violation of other laws. The reasonableness of the suspicion must be evaluated upon the totality 
of the circumstances at the time of the stop. This reasonable suspicion standard requires less than 
probable cause, but more than speculation or instinct on the part of an officer. (internal citations 
omitted)." State v. Naccarato, 878 P.2d 184 at 186, 126 Idaho 10 at 12 (Ct.App. 1994). 
Prior to effectuating the seizure of the vehicle and Appellant, Officer Ashcraft did not 
know who was inside the vehicle. Tr P. 7 Ls. 15-20. Officer Ashcraft's suspicion that Appellant 
was inside the vehicle was gleaned from the following information. An anonymous tip that 
Appellant drove the truck on a regular basis. Tr. P. 20 Ls. 11-18. The vehicle was registered to 
Appellant and Appellant's brother. Tr P. 6 Ls. 4-14. Officer Ashcraft does not know how many 
people are in the Appellant's family and acknowledged it is possible other people could drive the 
vehicle. Tr. P. 40 Ls. 6-12. The observation that the vehicle pulled into a driveway to a home 
where the Appellant does not live. Tr. P. 33 Ls. 16-24. The vehicle parked about two or three car 
lengths from the house. Tr. P. 34 Ls. 8-13. 
None of the information beyond the fact Appellant was one of the registered owners of 
the vehicle would support a belief that Appellant may be inside the vehicle. The Appellate 
Courts have previously found that the mere observation of a vehicle being driven by someone of 
the same gender as the unlicensed owner is insufficient to give rise to a reasonable suspicion of 
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unlawful activity. State v. Cerino, 117 P.3d 876, 141 Idaho 736 (Idaho App. 2005). Unlike 
advantage an the 
was was 
7 15-20. 
The information available to Officer Ashcraft did not provide reasonable suspicion to 
effectuate a seizure of Appellant. The evidence presented does not support the District Court's 
finding that reasonable suspicion existed for the seizure and the Order denying Appellant's 
motion to suppress should be reversed. 
Evidence Obtained Prior To the Determination Of The Nighttime Warrant Should Be 
Suppressed. 
In State v. Maland 140 Idaho 817 (Idaho 2004) the Idaho Supreme Court found that 
evidence obtained by police officers following the unlawful detention of a wanted person shall 
be excluded if the evidence was obtained prior to the discovery of the warrant of arrest. 
This rule was stated more succinctly in State v. Page, 140 Idaho 841 at 847 (Idaho 2004) 
as follows, 
It is important to note that had the drug evidence in this case been 
seized after the officer seized Page's license and took it back to the 
patrol vehicle, but prior to discovery of the valid warrant, the 
considerations outlined in Green would not justify the conclusion 
that the evidence was sufficiently attenuated from improper police 
conduct so as to be admissible. See, e.g., State v. Maland, 140 
Idaho 817, 103 P.3d 430, 2004 WL 2930716 (November 24, 
2004). In such a case, evidence seized prior to the arrest, unless 
justified by some other exception, would not be admissible simply 
because, ultimately, a valid arrest warrant was discovered. A 
judicial determination of probable cause focuses on the 
information and facts the officers possessed at the time. State v. 
Schwarz, 133 Idaho 463,467,988 P.2d 689,693 (1999). It is only 
the fact that there was an intervening factor between the unlawful 
seizure and discovery of the evidence--the discovery of the warrant 
in this case--that creates the exception, which permitted the officer 
to arrest Page and made the subsequent seizure of evidence 
admissible. 
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Prior to the seizure of Appellant, Officer Ashcraft confirmed that Appellant did not have 
a to 
Ashcraft knowledge the warrant prior to of 
Appellant, he did not identify whether the warrant allowed for nighttime service until after 
making contact with Appellant and then returning to his patrol car to confirm with dispatch. Tr. 
P. 39 Ls. 9-23. It is not in dispute that the seizure occurred at nighttime. Tr. P. 39 Ls. 24-25 and 
P.40 L. 1. 
Appellant argues that the intervening factor between the unlawful seizure and the 
discovery of Appellant as the driver of the vehicle was not the discovery of the misdemeanor 
warrant, but the discovery that the warrant could be executed at nighttime. A daytime only 
warrant could not be an intervening factor when the seizure occurred at night. 
Any evidence discovered prior to the intervening factor, including but not limited to the 
identification of Appellant as the driver of the vehicle, should be excluded from evidence. 
CONCLUSION 
The initial seizure of Appellant was unreasonable and a violation of his Fourth 
Amendment rights. Therefore, the District Court's Order that the seizure of Appellant was 
supported by reasonable suspicion should be reversed. Further, the confirmation of the 
nighttime warrant was an intervening factor in the otherwise unlawful seizure and all evidence 
discovered prior to the confirmation of the nighttime warrant, including but not limited to the 
identification of the Appellant as the driver of the vehicle, should be excluded. 
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DATED this 8th day of March 2016. 
LOVAN ROKER ROUNDS, P 
,G~J& 
Attorney for Appellant 
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